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In this paper we test whether poor households use cash transfers to invest in income generating 
activities that they otherwise would not have been able to do. Using data from a controlled 
randomized experiment, we find that transfers from the OPORTUNIDADES program to 
households in rural Mexico resulted in increased investment in micro-enterprise and agricultural 
activities. For each peso transferred, beneficiary households used 88 cents to purchase consumption 
goods and services, and invested the rest. The investments improved the household’s ability to 
generate income with an estimated rate of return of 17.55%,   suggesting that these households were 
both liquidity and credit constrained. By investing transfers to raise income, beneficiary households 
were able to increase their consumption by 34% after five and a half years in the program. These 
results suggest that cash transfers to the poor may raise long-term living standards, which are 
maintained after program benefits end.  
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0.  Introduction 
Five years ago when my oldest daughter was in school and we received money 
from PROGRESA, we saved 600 pesos to buy wood and the other materials for 
building a chicken coup, and with what was left we bought a few chickens. 
Since then, we have raised many chickens which we sometimes sell, and we 
collect 10 to 15 eggs per week that we eat ourselves. 
 
OPORTUNIDADES (PROGRESA) beneficiary in rural Mexico (August  2004)
1 
 
Cash transfer programs are important policy tools for fighting poverty in both developed 
and developing countries. A major concern in developed countries has been the extent to which 
beneficiary populations become dependent on government assistance for maintaining current 
consumption levels
2.  In contrast, we argue that beneficiary families in developing countries may 
invest part of their cash transfer in productive enterprises that boost their income generating ability 
and consequently raise living standards permanently. We test this hypothesis using a controlled 
randomized experiment to identify the extent to which beneficiary households from Mexico’s 
OPORTUNIDADES
3 program invested cash transfers in income generating activities, and the 
extent to which those investments increased long-term household consumption.   
In developing countries there are two primary pathways by which transfers correct market 
failures that limit investment in productive activities. First, transfers alleviate liquidity and credit 
constraints that contribute to poverty traps, whereby poor households are able to afford the startup 
costs associated with entrepreneurial activities
4. The households studied here, with under US $1 per 
day in per capita consumption, are likely to be liquidity constrained, and therefore unlikely to be 
able to afford the “low” levels of capital investment needed to start micro-entrepreneurial 
activities
5. Second, if transfers are perceived as a secure source of income, risk adverse households 
will be more willing to increase ownership of risky assets, even in the presence of risk. In these 
                                                 
1 From a qualitative survey of agricultural production and micro-enterprise activity in rural Mexico, 
conducted by the authors. Interview from August 3, 2004. 
2 See Moffit (1992) for a review of the US case. 
3 Skoufias (2005) provides a description of the program. 
4 Models along these lines are developed by authors including Banerjee and Newman (1993), Aghion and 
Bolton (1997), Lindh and Ohlsson (1998), Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000), and Banerjee (2004). 
5 McKenzie and Woodruff (2006) report that it takes $100 USD to start a micro-enterprise in Mexico.   2
ways, monetary assistance from OPORTUNIDADES provides a secure income stream that may 
help alleviate liquidity constraints and grant access to capital, leading to increased investment
6. 
This study uses the randomized experiment from the rural evaluation of the 
OPORTUNIDADES conditional cash transfer program to estimate the impact of an exogenous 
increase in unearned income on investment and long-term living standards. We find that 
beneficiaries invest in production and draft animals, and that previously landless beneficiary 
households obtain land for agricultural production. Furthermore, there are significant increases in 
the number of households that operate micro-enterprises. Our estimates indicate that for each peso 
transferred, beneficiary households consume 88 cents directly, and invest the rest. The aggregate 
effect of the investments yields a 1.8 cent increase in consumption for each peso of transfers 
received. These estimates indicate an estimated rate of return on investment of between 15.52% and 
17.55%. Through investments in productive activities, beneficiary households increased their 
consumption by 34% after five and a half years in the program. Because investments are made in 
productive assets and income-generating activities, the gains in living standards will likely be 
maintained even after program benefits end. 
Our study contributes to the relatively small literature that examines the potential impact of 
cash transfer programs on long-term living standards. Ravallion and Chen (2005) show that the 
lion’s share of temporary cash transfers given by an anti-poverty program in China were saved. 
Sadoulet, de Janvry and Davis (2001) argue that payments from the Mexican agricultural support 
program PROCAMPO are invested in farm production, and estimate an income multiplier in the 
range of 1.5 to 2.6. While not related directly to cash transfer programs, studies by Yang (2005) and 
Woodruff and Zenteno (2001), show that remittances are used as capital to invest in micro-
enterprises in the Philippines and Mexico, respectively.  
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 1 and 2 describe the OPORTUNIDADES 
human development program and review the program’s experimental design and data. In section 3, 
                                                 
6 Investment will also depend on expectations about the transfer’s temporal horizon and life-cycle 
considerations (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954; Friedman 1957 and Hall 1978).   3
we present evidence of the causal effect of OPORTUNIDADES on increased investments in 
agricultural and micro-enterprise activities. Having established that cash transfers lead to more 
investment, section 4 develops a basic model of investment to illustrate the relationship between 
consumption, transfers and investment that we then estimate empirically. Section 5 provides a 
series of robustness tests to support our main findings and section 6 concludes.  
 
1.  The Rural OPORTUNIDADES Program 
The Mexican Government established OPORTUNIDADES (originally called PROGRESA) 
in 1997. The program was designed to alleviate current poverty and break its intergenerational 
transmission by inducing parents to invest in the human capital of children. In this sense, 
OPORTUNIDADES was conceived as a temporary program (i.e. over the course of three to four 
decades), which would become obsolete once the current generation of beneficiary children reaches 
adulthood.  
Cash transfers from OPORTUNIDADES are given to the female head of household
7, and 
are conditional on children attending school, family members obtaining preventive medical care 
through clinic visits and attending “pláticas” or education talks on health related topics. 
OPORTUNIDADES is the largest conditional cash transfer program of its kind. It distributed 
approximately 3 billion US dollars to some 5 million beneficiary households in 2004
8.  
The cash transfers come in two forms.  The first is a bimonthly fixed food stipend 
conditional on family members obtaining preventive medical care and is intended for families to 
spend on more and better nutrition. The second type of transfer comes in the form of educational 
scholarships and is given conditional on children attending school a minimum of 85% of the time 
and on not repeating a grade more than twice. Specifically, OPORTUNIDADES provides 
bimonthly cash scholarships for each child less than 18 years old enrolled in school between the 
third grade of primary school and the third grade (last) of junior high. High school scholarships are 
                                                 
7 Scholarships for beneficiaries in upper-secondary school can be received by the youth themselves. 
8 www.oportunidades.gob.mx   4
granted to all beneficiaries younger than 21 years old who are enrolled in school. The educational 
stipend varies by grade and gender. It rises substantially after graduation from primary school and 
is higher for girls than boys during junior high and high school. Beneficiary children also receive 
money for school supplies once or twice a year. There is an upper limit in the total transfer received 
per household. Table 1 details transfer amounts in October 1997 prices. 
When OPORTUNIDADES was first rolled out in rural areas starting in 1997, program 
eligibility was determined in two stages (Skoufias et al. 2001). First, the program identified 
underserved or marginalized communities and then identified low-income households within those 
communities. Selection criteria for marginalized communities were based on the proportion of 
households living in very poor conditions, identified by using data from the 1995 census (Conteo de 
Población y Vivienda).  For the selection of eligible households within marginalized communities, 
OPORTUNIDADES  conducted a socio-economic survey, the Encuesta de Características 
Socioeconómicas de los Hogares (ENCASEH). This census of households was used to classify 
households as eligible for treatment (“poor”) or ineligible (“non-poor”) using a proxy means test 
(PMT). Using the 1997 ENCASEH, the original classification scheme designated approximately 
52% of households as eligible (“poor”)
9.
  
All eligible households living in treatment localities were offered OPORTUNIDADES and 
a majority (90%) enrolled in the program. Once enrolled, households received benefits for a three-
year period conditional on meeting the program requirements. New households were not able to 
enroll until the next certification period which prevented migration into treatment communities for 
OPORTUNIDADES  benefits. Households in rural areas were “recertified” (re-assessed with a 
proxy means test) after three years on the program to determine future eligibility. If a household 
was recertified as eligible, it would continue receiving benefits. If not recertified, the household was 
guaranteed three more years of support followed by three years of transitional support. Thus, 
                                                 
9 Later the Government decided that a subset of the “non-poor” households had been unduly excluded. They 
expanded the eligibility criteria to include a set of slightly wealthier households in a process called 
“densification” (Hoddinott and Skoufias 2004).    5
households could expect a minimum of nine years of benefits upon enrolling in the program 
(OPORTUNIDADES 2003).   
In order to transfer the cash, OPORTUNIDADES had to verify that households actually 
completed the required health care visits by having medical providers from the public clinics who 
administered the services certify that the household had completed the requirements. A similar 
procedure was followed for the cash transfer associated with school attendance. About 1 percent of 
households were denied the cash transfer for non-compliance.  
 
2.  Experimental Design and Data 
Our analysis takes advantage of the controlled-randomized evaluation design implemented 
by the Mexican Government to conduct a rigorous impact evaluation of OPORTUNIDADES. Due 
to budgetary and logistical constraints, the Government was unable to enroll all eligible families 
simultaneously. Rather, it needed to phase in enrollment over a period of time. For ease of 
implementation, the Government decided that it would enroll whole communities at a time and that 
it would enroll them as fast as possible so that no eligible household would be kept out of the 
program. As a result of this process, the government randomly chose 320 treatment and 186 control 
communities in seven states for a total of 506 experimental communities. Eligible households in 
treatment communities began receiving benefits in April of 1998, and eligible households in control 
communities were not incorporated until November of 1999 nor were they informed that 
OPORTUNIDADES would provide benefits to them until two months before incorporation.   
The data used in this paper comes from household evaluation surveys and administrative 
records of the amount of money transferred to households. Detailed information on a host of topics 
was collected in a series of rural evaluation surveys, the Encuesta de Evaluación de los Hogares 
Rurales (ENCEL). The ENCELs survey all eligible and ineligible households in treatment and 
control communities. The sub-sample used for the main analysis in this paper is restricted to 
eligible households classified as poor, although we also use ineligible (non-poor) households for   6
robustness checks. There are three rounds of data during which eligible households in control 
communities did not receive transfers (October 1998, May 1999 and November 1999), and a 
straightforward comparison of treatments and controls is possible. Once control communities were 
incorporated into the program at the end of 1999, an additional three rounds of data were collected 
during which eligible households in both types of communities were receiving benefits (May 2000, 
November 2000 and November 2003). In addition, baseline data from the 1997 pre-intervention 
ENCASEH census is used for a total of seven rounds of data between 1997 and 2003.  
Our sample consists of 7,658 poor households that were eligible for the program in the 320 
treatment communities and 4,644 poor households that were eligible for the program in the 186 
control communities (Table 2). We refer to this sample as the “intent to treat” or ITT sample.  
Baseline data for this sample are described in detail in Table 3A. The sample is well balanced 
across control and treatment groups.  We report the test of difference in means across control and 
treatment groups, finding no statistically significant differences for 33 out of 35 characteristics 
measured at baseline. This suggests that the randomization was effective in generating truly 
exogenous variation in the treatment. 
We also conduct the analysis with a second sample designed to estimate the effect of 
treatment on the treated (TOT). In these analyses, we use the approximately 90 percent of eligible 
households that actually took up the program, 6,819 treatment households and 4,159 control 
households that took up the program when offered in late 1999. A potential source of bias arises in 
the TOT sample if observed and unobserved time varying characteristics are driving the 
household’s decision to participate in the program. We assume the group of controls that took up 
the program when offered in late 1999 would have taken up the program if offered earlier in 1998. 
The fact that take up rates amongst treatment and controls are almost identical (90%) supports this 
hypothesis (Table 2 and Graph 1). Furthermore, the TOT sample baseline observables are well 
balanced, with only 1 statistically significant difference out of 35 characteristics tested (Table 3B).   7
Given this evidence, we conclude that working with the actual beneficiaries does not introduce 
selection bias coming from heterogeneous take up responses. 
 
3.  Investment 
In this section, we estimate the effect of OPORTUNIDADES on investments in agriculture 
and micro-enterprise activities. We show that beneficiary households increase agricultural assets 
and participation in micro-enterprise activities, suggesting that some of the cash transfer was used 
for investment in productive assets. Section 3.1 presents the empirical specification based on the 
randomized design of the OPORTUNIDADES evaluation sample, section 3.2 presents comparisons 
of means, and sections 3.3 and 3.4 discuss the main investment results.   
3.1.  Specification and Identification 
Our analysis exploits the exogenous variation introduced by random assignment of 
treatment to estimate the effect of OPORTUNIDADES on investment in agricultural production 
and micro-enterprise activity, the two most common domestic income generating activities in this 
population. We estimate two types of models: one exploiting the community randomization to 
obtain average treatment effects, and a second which exploits the variation in transfer amounts to 
estimate the effect of the size of the transfer on investments.  
To estimate the first specification we use the exogenous variation generated by the 
randomized phasing in of the program. Beneficiary households in treatment communities received 
transfers for just over a year and a half longer than beneficiary households in control areas. Given 
the timing of the ENCEL surveys, we first observe treatment households in October 1998, 
approximately 6 months following the first transfer payment. Treatment households would have 
received three bimonthly transfer payments by the time of the first follow up survey. Since control 
communities did not begin receiving payments until November-December of 1999, there are three 
rounds of data (October 1998, May 1999 and November 1999) where a simple comparison of 
eligible households in treatment and control communities is possible.    8
For these three rounds, we estimate the following reduced form: 
∑ ∑ + + + + + =
k
ijt j ij k
t
t t ij o ijt u X WAVE T A ε β α α α 97 , 2 1 ,             (1)  
where Aijt denotes productive assets of household i in community j in period t; Tij is a binary 
indicator equal to 1 if eligible household i lives in a treatment community in the ITT specification, 
or if the household has received benefits in the TOT specification; WAVEt takes on the value 1 in 
period t, and the Xij,97 are household and community characteristics measured at baseline. The error 
term has two components: an idiosyncratic disturbance, εijt, and a community random effect, uj, that 
accounts for the correlation within communities over time. Note that the dependent variable in the 
analysis is the level of assets and not investment during the period.  If the randomization 
successfully balanced the treatment and control groups, the level of pre-treatment assets would have 
been the same in treatment and control households (we explicitly test this assumption in section 
3.2). Under this assumption, the coefficient  1 α is the average treatment effect on productive assets. 
The second specification takes advantage of the variation in total cumulative transfers 
introduced both by the randomized phasing in of the program and the variation in the transfer 
amount based on the demographic structure of the household. The randomization meant that 
treatment households had been accumulating transfers for about 18 months longer than control 
households (Graph 1).  In addition, households with more children in school and enrolled in higher 
grades (more female children in higher grades in particular) had higher transfer amounts, and 
therefore accumulated transfers faster than similar households with fewer children in school or with 
more male children. Graph 2 illustrates the variation in household demographic structure, plotting 
shares of households by number of children enrolled in any grade between the third year of primary 
and the third year of junior high
10. 
                                                 
10 Households with teenagers enrolled in high school are excluded because high school stipends were 
granted beginning in the 2001-02 school year (following the experimental period), and because of the low 
high school enrollment rates (only 33% of 15 to 21 year olds report being enrolled in high school).   9
The second specification uses all six rounds of data from 1998 through 2003 to estimate the 
differential effects of cumulative transfers on productive assets. Cumulative transfer quintiles are 
constructed for each household-wave observation based on the total transfer amount a household 
has accumulated at that point in time. These new variables are constructed as indicator variables for 
the quintile a household belongs to in each round. It is important to note that they are constructed 
on the distribution of transfers across all waves of data and not within each round. We then use the 
cumulative transfer quintile dummy variables to estimate the following specification: 
∑ ∑ ∑ + + + + + =
= k
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1
, 1          (2) 
where Qijt,p equals 1 if household i in community j in period t falls in the p-th quintile of the total 
cumulative transfer distribution. We specify the effect of cumulative transfers non-linearly so as to 
allow for jumps in investment due to the potential lumpiness of certain types of investment. 
One potential concern with the specification in equation (2) is that actual total cumulative 
transfers are determined in part by household decisions to send their children to school. If 
households decide their children should work instead of going to school, then part of the income 
generated from work may be invested.  In this case, we would obtain a biased estimate of the 
impact of the transfer amount on investment.  
In order to correct for this potential endogeneity we use the potential transfer the household 
would have received if all eligible children were enrolled in school. To compute potential transfers, 
we take household composition and children’s enrollment status at baseline and apply the program 
rules, assuming the child progresses one grade per year with no school drop outs and no repetition. 
Our IV is therefore constructed from pre-intervention household demographic structure interacted 
with timing of incorporation into the program (which was determined randomly). Since the 
potential transfer amounts include no household behavioral response but are highly correlated with 
actual transfers, it is a valid instrument of the actual transfer amounts.  We also control for the   10
number of household members and share of children directly, so that the IV is not confounded with 
family composition effects. 
Graphs 3a and 3b plot the distributions of the actual and potential current and accumulated 
transfers, respectively. As shown, the distributions of the potential transfers follow those of the 
actual transfers very closely. As expected, the potential transfers are an over-estimate of the actual 
transfers (given non-compliance, administrative delays in payments, etc). The simple correlation 
amongst them is 0.89. If we control for time effects and baseline covariates, the potential transfer 
explains 55.7% of the total transfer and 65.9% of the variation of the cumulative transfer. Graph 4 
plots mean cumulative transfer by quintile for the distributions of actual and potential cumulative 
transfers. 
3.2.   Comparison of Means 
The dependent variables for agricultural assets come from the six rounds of the ENCEL 
that contain information on animal ownership and amount of land in use over the 12 months 
preceding the interview (hectares of land for agriculture, grazing and/or forestry purposes). We 
define production animals to be those whose meat and/or by-products (milk, cheese, eggs, etc.) are 
sold and consumed. These include goats and sheep, cattle (cows), poultry (chickens, hens and 
turkeys), pigs and rabbits. We define draft animals to be those traditionally used for farming 
(plowing) and/or for transportation purposes.  These include donkeys, mules, horses and oxen. We 
transform all of these animals into “cow equivalents” using the ratio of the price of the animal 
divided by the price of a cow. Therefore, we create cow-equivalent indices of production and draft 
animals. Land is measured in hectares and includes all plots used by the household
11. 
The dependent variables for (non-agricultural) micro-enterprises come from five rounds of 
the ENCEL surveys (October 1998 to December 2000).  A set of questions ask the household head 
whether somebody in that household had engaged in a “self-motivated” non-agricultural activity 
which generates income during the month before the interview. The list of activities includes 
                                                 
11 A detailed description of the sample and variables is available upon request.   11
sewing clothes, making food for sale, carpentry and construction, sale of non-food items such as 
handcrafts, transportation of people or goods in own vehicle, repair of artifacts or machinery, 
domestic service (wash, iron or cook for a fee), or other activities done on your own. We define 
micro-enterprise as participation in any of these activities. No micro-enterprise activities were 
collected in the 1997 baseline survey, and because of lack of comparability (changes in the 
categories and time frame considered), we do not include the 2003 round. 
For the purpose of analysis, we classify households according to the amount of land used 
and agricultural asset ownership at baseline. We distinguish between: (i) households with no 
agricultural assets, (ii) landless farms (households reporting no land use but animal ownership), (iii) 
smaller landed farms (households using at least 3 ha of land for agricultural, grazing or forestry 
purposes, regardless of animal ownership), and (iv) bigger farms (households using more than 3 ha, 
regardless of animal ownership). Around one tenth of the sample has no agricultural assets, 31% of 
households are landless but have some animals, 45% have smaller farms and 13% have bigger 
farms. We check for balance between treatment and control households within farm size categories 
in Table 3A in the Data Appendix.  
With random assignment of communities to treatment and control groups, we would expect 
that ownership of farm assets at baseline would be equal between the two groups. Then, any 
subsequent changes could be attributed to the program. In effect, when we compare agricultural 
assets of treatment and control households in the TOT sample prior to intervention, we find no 
statistically significant differences in mean values (Table 4 Panel A).  
    During the experimental period (October 1998 through November 1999), a simple 
comparison of the mean values for each dependent variable between households in treatment and 
control communities gives us an estimate of the program impact (see Table 4 Panel B). We report 
the results both for whether the household had any of the asset type and for the amount of the asset.  
We observe significant increases in the likelihood of draft and production animal ownership for all 
households and in particular for households with no agricultural assets (increases in production   12
animal ownership only), landless households (increases in draft animal ownership only) and bigger 
farms (increases in both types of animal ownership). There are significant (at the 10% level) 
increases in land use for landless households (including households with no agricultural assets) and 
significant increases in the number of production animals for landless and smaller farms. 
Production animals generally require lower capital investments than draft animals. Thus, it is 
plausible that households with no farm assets initiate animal production by buying small animals 
that yield relatively quick returns (for example eggs and meat from chickens or turkeys). 
For micro-enterprises, the comparison of means between treatment and control households 
during the experimental period suggests important program effects on the likelihood of engaging in 
micro-entrepreneurial activity. Specifically, when activities traditionally done by men 
(construction/carpentry and machinery repair, which are 92% and 77% male respectively) are 
excluded from the dependent variable, households in the treatment group have 58 percent more 
micro-enterprises than those in the control group. Results hold for landless and smaller farms.
  
3.3.   Estimated Treatment Effects 
We estimate the effect of OPORTUNIDADES on both the probability of owning an asset 
and the amount of the asset owned for draft animals, production animals and land. For the 
probability of having an asset type, we first report the results for the whole sample and then for a 
sample that is restricted to households that had none of the asset at baseline. Analogously, for the 
amount of the asset type, we first report the estimate on the whole sample and then restrict the 
sample to those households with positive levels of the asset at baseline. The probability of owning 
an asset conditional on having none at baseline provides insight on whether the program induced 
households to start a farm business (variation at the extensive margin), whereas the estimated 
impact of the amount of an asset conditional on having some of that asset at baseline tells us about 
how the program influenced households to expand their already existing farm assets (variation at 
the intensive margin).    13
The results of these analyses are presented in Table 5. In Panel I we report the estimated 
impact of the program on asset ownership (and land use).  Each cell reports the estimated impact of 
the program on an asset type (columns) using a particular model specification (rows).  For each of 
the asset types listed in the columns, we first report the results using the whole sample and then for 
the sample restricted to those that did not own any of the assets at baseline. The rows report the 
empirical specification used.  Models A and B in the first two rows report the estimated ITT and 
TOT impacts, respectively, without controls. Models C and D add baseline household and 
community controls. The list of controls includes household head and spouse’s ages and education, 
head’s ethnicity, household demographic composition and size, baseline assets (home ownership, 
dirt floor and electricity), and community characteristics (male agricultural wage in the community, 
distance to large urban center and presence of community work associations). The descriptive 
statistics for the controls are presented in Tables 3A and 3B. 
In Panel I of Table 5 (Model D - TOT with controls), we observe that the probability of 
draft animal ownership is 2.2 percentage points higher in treatment households than in control 
households, conditional on no draft animal ownership in 1997. Similarly, treatment households are 
6.2 percentage points more likely to own production animals, conditional on no production animal 
ownership at baseline. Given the average levels of asset ownership for control households in the 
estimation sample, these coefficients imply that treatment households are 20.2% more likely to own 
draft animals and 13.4% more likely to own production animals than control households. Results 
are robust to the exclusion of covariates (Model B) and/or inclusion of all intent to treat households 
(Models A and C). Finally, the 5.2 percentage point (15.7%) increase in the conditional probability 
of land use suggests that landless households are acquiring land.   
In Model E, we interact the treatment indicator with the level of agricultural assets prior to 
the intervention. We hypothesize that households with existing assets are more likely to invest more 
as they have already paid the fixed costs of startup. The estimates from Model E are in line with 
this hypothesis. Only households owning animals at baseline significantly increase draft animal   14
ownership under treatment. Landless households and small farms increase draft animal ownership 
by 3.5 and 2.9 percentage points respectively (conditional model). On the other hand, treatment 
households with no agricultural assets at baseline are 9.4 percentage points more likely to increase 
production animal ownership than control households. Households with no baseline agricultural 
assets and landless households increase land use by 4.9 to 6.5 percentage points respectively (10% 
significance).  
Panel II in Table 5 presents the estimated impacts of the program on the amount owned of 
each asset. Again, there is no difference between the ITT and TOT models with or without controls.  
Model D shows that conditional on having draft animals at baseline, there is an  increase in the 
number of cow equivalent draft animals of 0.062 cows (or equivalently, 0.15 horses or 0.41 mules) 
for all households (10% significance). Households with small farms increase the number of cow 
equivalent draft animals by 0.078 cows (or equivalently, 0.19 horses or 0.51 mules), conditional on 
having draft animals at baseline. Production animals increase by 0.125 cow equivalents (significant 
at the 10% level), equal to approximately 0.70 goats, 0.79 pigs or 6.76 chickens and/or turkeys. 
Effects are larger in magnitude for households with big farms at baseline. For big farms in the 
conditional sample, OPORTUNIDADES increases the number of draft animals by 0.112 cow 
equivalents (0.27 horses or 0.73 mules), and increases the number of production animals by 0.291 
cow equivalents (1.63 goats, 1.84 pigs or 15.75 chickens and/or turkeys). Finally, big farms 
increase land usage by 0.162 hectares on the unconditional sub-sample
12.  
The effect of OPORTUNIDADES on micro-enterprise participation is estimated with a set 
of probit regressions. Results are presented in Table 6. Models A and B present the average 
treatment effect when no controls are included, for the ITT and TOT sub-samples, respectively. 
Models C and D incorporate household and community controls. For this period, treated households 
                                                 
12 For the October 1998, May 1999 and November 2003 rounds of the ENCEL, we have information on 
land ownership which allows us to classify land into “owned land”, if any households member is reported 
to be the owner; and “non-owned land”, if the plot is reported to be rented, borrowed or in tenancy. Results 
(available upon request) show an increase of approximately 0.034 ha (340m
2) in the use of non-owned land 
for beneficiary households.   15
have a 2.5 to 2.8 percentage point higher participation in micro-enterprise activities than control 
households. Given a mean participation rate in micro-enterprise of 5.9% by control households over 
the sample period, treatment households are approximately 42.3% to 47.7% more likely to engage 
in micro-enterprise activity. The last column in Table 6 shows the same set of regressions for 
predominantly female micro-enterprise activity participation. We find a positive treatment effect of 
2.8 percentage points without controls, and 3.0 percentage points with controls, or a 58.9% increase 
in the likelihood of having a micro-enterprise
13.  
3.4.   Estimated Transfer Effects 
In Table 7, we present the estimates of the intensity of treatment as measured by the 
quintile of the accumulated transfer distribution (equation (2)).  The results are reported in six 
panels. The first three panels report the estimated effects of the amount of the transfer on the 
probability of owning the asset type and the second group of three panels reports the results for the 
impact on the amount of the asset owned. In all of the panels, Model A shows estimates using the 
quintiles of the cumulative potential transfer, which can be compared to estimates using the 
cumulative actual transfer in Model B. Note the similarity in magnitude and significance between 
estimates in models A and B.  Model C repeats Model B using the conditional sample; either not 
owning the asset at baseline for the probability of ownership models or owning some of the asset at 
baseline for the amount models.  Model D further interacts treatment with baseline farm size.  
A noteworthy pattern emerging from Table 7 is that households receiving higher 
accumulated transfers per wave have a higher likelihood of investing in agricultural assets. Point 
estimates on each quintile, while positive and increasing with the quintile, are generally significant 
only at the top quintiles, suggesting a possible threshold in the amount of accumulated transfers 
needed to start investing. For production animals, significant increases are achieved at lower 
                                                 
13 We have further analyzed female micro-enterprises by activity type (results available upon request). 
Interestingly, we find large and significant differences in handcraft enterprises amongst treatment and 
control households, but no differences in domestic services. Handcraft manufacture requires a larger initial 
capital expenditure than domestic services (which might only imply transportation costs if the jobs are in 
distant locations) and thus are more likely to be restricted by liquidity constraints.   16
quintiles. This is not surprising since smaller amounts of money are required to purchase a 
production animal (a turkey, a goat, etc) than a draft animal (a horse or an ox). The effect per 
quintile on the probability of land use follows the same general pattern. Effects are larger on the 
conditional estimates, again suggesting that initially landless households are acquiring more land 
(Model C). The number of hectares used is positive and increasing with the quintile of cumulative 
transfers except for the top quintile. One possible explanation for this result is that households 
might be afraid to lose their eligibility status if they accumulate too many easily verifiable assets. 
Results are similar when conditioning on baseline farm size (Models D in Table 7).  
 
4.  Consumption 
Section 3 presented evidence that OPORTUNIDADES beneficiaries increased farm 
production and micro-enterprise activity. In this section, we turn our attention to the effect of these 
investments on living standards.  Specifically, we are interested in the effect of the program on 
income and consumption.  One of the limiting factors in this analysis is that we do not have income 
data, but rather only consumption. Therefore we need to infer the key structural parameters for a 
consumption model. The parameters of interest are the marginal propensity to consume and to 
invest (or save), and the return on these investments. We begin with a discussion of the 
specification and identification in the context of a simple inter-temporal consumption and 
investment model
14.  We then describe the estimation and results. We test a number of important 
identifying assumptions in the next section. 
4.1 Model and Empirical Specification 
In this section we derive the empirical specification for the consumption equation from the set 
of budget and productive constraints the household faces in the context of an inter-temporal utility 
maximization model. Consider a setting where household income is derived from a family business 
and government transfers, and the household is credit constrained. In each period, the household 
                                                 
14 Note that it is beyond the scope of this paper to estimate a full household structural savings and 
investment behavioral model. Instead, we sketch a simple statistical model which allows us to interpret the 
reduced form estimates obtained in the empirical analysis.   17
decides how much of its income is consumed and how much is invested in the family farm or 
micro-enterprise so that its budget constraint is: 
t t t t I PT Y C − + =                                                    (3)  
where Ct  is consumption in period t, Yt is income from the household’s productive activities, PTt 
are public transfers, and It denotes investment.  
For simplicity, we will assume that the family business production is a function of business 
assets, At, and family labor, L: 
     t t t A L Y ε γ + = ) (                                                         (4) 
where εt is a zero mean random productivity shock such as weather or illness. We assume that only 
family labor is used for production, which is consistent with the data. Moreover, we are not 
allowing family labor time allocations to be a choice in this model.   
Let δ be the depreciation rate. Then, the household can increase its stock of productive 
assets through investment, and accumulates assets as follows, 
1 1 − − + = t t t I A A δ                                   ( 5 )  
We assume that households are credit and liquidity constrained. This implies that the 
maximum amount households can invest in a single period is their income in that period and that 
investment cannot be negative; i.e. 
     0 ≥ t I                                        (6) 
The household chooses consumption and investment to maximize the discounted present 
value of consumption. The resulting Euler equation at t is: 
( ) ) ( ) ( ' ) ( ' 1 t t t t I C U L C U λ βγ + = +                                     (7) 
where  ) ( t t I λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (6). The optimal levels of 
consumption and therefore investment equate the marginal utility of current consumption to the 
marginal utility of future consumption plus the marginal cost of the liquidity constraint on   18
investment.  The solution in (7) provides us with the optimal marginal propensity to consume out of 
income, which we denote αt. 
Consider the first two periods that households receive transfers from OPORTUNIDADES. 
In this case, the optimal consumption level in the second period after transfers begin is: 
    () () ( ) [] ( )( ) [ ] () ( ) [] t t t t t t L PT L PT A L L C ε α αγ αε α αγ α α γ δ δ αγ − + + − + + − + = + + − + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1      (8) 
where α is the marginal propensity to consume and (1 – α) is the marginal propensity to invest
15. 
Consumption is a function of initial assets and family labor, current transfers, lagged transfers and 
productivity shocks. The coefficient on current transfers is just the marginal propensity to consume.  
The coefficient on lagged transfer consists of three structural parameters. Working backwards, the 
first is the marginal propensity to invest (1-α), which when multiplied times transfers yields the 
amount of the transfer invested.  The second parameter is the marginal productivity of investment, 
γ(L), which when multiplied times investment yields income earned from the investment. The third 
parameter is the marginal propensity to consume, α, which when multiplied times income yields the 
amount of income earned from the investment that is consumed. 
For each round of data from 1998 through 2003 where there is consumption data available, 
we estimate (8) as the following reduced form: 
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2 1                                 (9) 
where Cijt is monthly per capita adult equivalent consumption
16 of household i living in community 








months lagged total per capita cumulative transfers, i.e. the total transfer amount the household had 
accumulated until six months prior to the current round of the ENCEL survey (t). Since 
                                                 
15 For simplicity, we assumed that the marginal propensity to consume is constant over time. However, if 
OPORTUNIDADES significantly relaxed the liquidity constraint, the marginal propensity to consume 
might fall over time. We tested and rejected this assumption against the alternative of a constant marginal 
propensity to consume. 
16 We define adult equivalent household size as the number of children age 12 or younger times 0.5 plus the 
number family members older than 12.   19
consumption is also a function of initial assets and household labor endowments, we include 
baseline household demographics, the community wage rate and head and spouse characteristics, 
i.e. the Xij,97 
17. As before, the error term is composed of an idiosyncratic disturbance,  ijt ξ , and a 
community random effect, vj.  
    The specification in (9) allows us to identify the marginal propensity to consume and the 
increase in consumption from investment.  The marginal propensity to consume, α, is just the 
coefficient on current transfers, φ1. The rate of return in terms of increased income, γ, 
is () 1 1 2 1 φ φ φ − , where φ2 is the coefficient on lagged transfers, and the rate of return in terms of 
consumption is  () 1 2 1 φ φ − .  
4.2 Estimated Treatment Effects  
We now turn to the analysis of the effects of current and lagged cumulative transfers on 
consumption. Our aim here is to determine the proportion of the cash transfer that is consumed 
directly out of current transfers, with the remainder being saved or invested. We then capture the 
long run effects of the program on consumption through the total cumulative transfer amount 
lagged by 6 months, and argue that any increased long run consumption is achieved through 
productive investments.  
We estimate (9) for the 4 rounds of the ENCEL for which we have detailed consumption 
information, including home produced consumption. As has been previously discussed, because 
reception of the transfer is conditional on school enrollment, the transfer amount received is 
endogenous to household behavior. Thus, we instrument current and lagged actual transfers with 
their “potential” counterparts
18. The standard errors are clustered at the community level to control 
for the correlation of the productivity shocks within communities over time. 
                                                 
17 The full list of controls is kept the same as for the investment runs with the exception that baseline 
household size is replaced with baseline household size adult equivalent for the consumption runs. 
18  Separate identification of lagged cumulative transfers from current transfers is possible because 
treatment households were randomly assigned benefits a year and a half before control households.   20
The consumption measurement used for the analysis is constructed as total household 
expenditures on food and non-food items, plus home produced consumption
19. Expenditures and 
home produced consumption are separately identifiable in the data. Households are asked about the 
quantity and expenditures of goods purchased over the week before the interview, as well as how 
much of their own production of that good was consumed. We use community level prices to 
impute a value for household production. Previous research on the OPORTUNIDADES program 
estimates that monetary transfers from the program represent approximately 20% of pre-program 
consumption (Hoddinott and Skoufias 2004; Skoufias 2005). The summary statistics presented in 
Table 8 show a similar result, with the mean transfer amount in treatment households equal to 21% 
of consumption in control households. Comparing the consumption levels of households in 
treatment and control communities, we observe that treatment households consume approximately 
22 pesos more per capita per month, representing 61% of the average per capita monthly transfer of 
36 pesos. This simple comparison of consumption levels in treatment and control households 
suggests that households do not consume the entire transfer amount each month, and that some of 
the transfer is saved or invested.  
Table 9 presents least squares (LS) and two stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of 
equation (9) for the entire sub-sample of households. Instrumental variable estimates (including 
controls) on monthly transfers per capita indicate that, on average, 0.884 pesos of each peso 
transferred are consumed. The coefficient on cumulative transfers is  2 ˆ φ =0.018. These results 
indicate that households consume over four fifths of the transfers directly. The household invests 
the remaining 0.116 pesos of each peso transferred, and obtains a return of 0.018 on each peso 
transferred in terms per capita consumption terms. The return on each peso invested (γˆ ) is 15.52% 
in terms of consumption and 17.55% in terms of income. 
                                                 
19 Alternative consumption measures were imputed using quantity consumed times median community 
prices, and yield comparable results. The consumption measurement used here sums reported expenditures 
and the imputed value of home production for food and non-food items in a detailed consumption module.      21
The implied long term effects of the transfers on living standards through the investment 
pathways are dramatic. In 2003, after five and one-half years on the program, households in the 
treatment group received an average cumulative transfer of $3,444 pesos per capita. Through the 
increased income from invested transfers, the average beneficiary consumed 62 pesos more per 
month
20. Thus, after five and a half years, transfers increased consumption by 34% through the 
investment pathway
21.  Since the 34% increase in consumption is through investment in income 
generating activities, it should continue even if the household dropped out of the program. 
These results also suggested that households were liquidity constrained. The estimated rate 
of return on investment, 17.55%, is substantially higher than the average annual real interest rate in 
the economy for the entire period (1997 to 2003), which was approximately 6.1%
22. We take this 
result as evidence that these households face imperfect credit markets, since obtaining investments 
in productive activities would yield net gains. In fact, access to credit for the poor rural households 
in our sample is very limited. In the two rounds of the evaluation survey (May and November 1999) 
where questions on access to credit are asked, only 2.4% of households report using credit.  
4.3 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
Table 10 presents 2SLS estimates of the effects of current and lagged transfers interacted 
with farm size in 1997, the age of the head of household, head’s education, and distance (in Km) to 
the closest urban center. The purpose of such interactions is to determine whether household 
heterogeneity affects preferences (the marginal propensity to consume) and/or productivity (the rate 
of return).   
Non-agricultural households (households with no agricultural assets at baseline) have the 
highest marginal propensity to consume, while the other three types of households have a similar 
                                                 
20 “Permanent” rise in consumption estimated as average cumulative transfers per capita for beneficiary 
households in the treatment group times the coefficient on returns from investment,  2 ˆ φ , estimated as 0.018. 
21 The percentage increase is measured relative to first round of data where consumption data are available. In 
this survey eligible households in control communities have a real per-capita expenditure of $183 pesos. 
22 The annual real interest rate (computed on the 28-day Inter-Bank Equilibrium Interest Rate) was 5.5% in 
1997 and 2.8% in 2003. The average annual real interest rate for the whole period is 6.1% (source: Bank of 
Mexico and National Institute of Geography and Statistics, INEGI). We take this rate as our benchmark 
since investments are likely to have occurred over the whole period.   22
marginal propensity to consume, not significantly different from 0.867. There is no significant 
difference in the effect of cumulative transfers on consumption either, with a constant return of 
0.018 pesos per peso accumulated. Column 3 in Table 10 indicates that the older the head of the 
household, the lower the estimated marginal propensity to consume, resulting in a larger remainder 
left for saving or investment (result not statistically significant). However, this reduction in the 
marginal propensity to consume becomes smaller with age (positive coefficient on the age squared 
term). As one expects, there is a larger effect on consumption coming from lagged transfers for 
households with older heads, and once again, this increase becomes smaller over time. Thus, the 
transfer amount interacted with the age of the head of the household fits a concave function, which 
is consistent with a life-cycle model.  
Column 4 of Table 10 shows that having a positive amount of education reduces the per 
capita marginal propensity to consume out of current transfers and increases per capita consumption 
coming from lagged (invested) transfers (the omitted category is no education). Thus, years of 
education seem to enhance productive activities slightly. Such results are coherent with the effect 
on age if we assume that basic education has expanded over time in rural communities so that 
younger people are likely to be more educated than older people. The interaction between distance 
to an urban center and lagged transfers (Column 5 in Table 10) is negative and significant. 
Households in more isolated communities may have overall lower return on investments, likely due 
to the fact that input and output markets are either difficult to access or completely unavailable. The 
final column of table 10 shows that all the effects are robust to jointly including all interactions in 
the same specification.  
 
5.  Robustness Tests 
Despite the identification strategy adopted here, our estimates of the marginal propensities 
to consume are subject to a number of potential biases or alternative interpretations. Even in a 
perfect randomized setting, general equilibrium effects that arise as a result of the program may   23
drive the changes in household consumption and in saving/investment behavior. In what follows, 
we discuss a series of potential biases, the reasons why we should worry about them, and how they 
are resolved in this context.   
5.1.  Macro Income and Price Effects 
OPORTUNIDADES infused small rural communities with large amounts of transfers to 
over half the residents.  The transfers could have had multiplier effects on income and cause price 
inflation in treatment communities.  These community macro effects could have caused prices to 
rise in treatment areas faster than control areas.  Therefore, our estimated effects on consumption 
could be increases in prices rather than in living standards. In addition, it is possible that the 
observed increases in micro-enterprise and farm activities could be driven by a community macro 
income effect derived from the presence of OPORTUNIDADES in the community, rather than by 
increased liquidity from the transfers at the household level. 
We address this concern in two ways.  First, we compare agricultural wages for males, 
females and children between treatment and control communities.  Second, we compare the 
consumption levels and investments in micro-enterprise and farm activities of ineligible households 
in treatment and control communities. Table 11 reports the comparisons of means for community 
wages between treatment and control communities, and the comparisons of mean consumption and 
investment levels for ineligible households after the implementation of the program. We find no 
significant differences between control and treatment areas for any of the variables. Moreover, 
Hoddinot and Skoufias (2004) find no differences for food prices between treatment and control 
communities, giving more support to the inexistence of local price and macro income effects.  
5.2.  Labor Supply Effects 
OPORTUNIDADES transfers could be taken in leisure by reducing labor supply. If so, 
income in treatment households would be reduced over time, as would consumption. Everything 
else held constant, treatment households would experience lower increases in consumption with 
respect to control households, the larger the transfer received. In this case, our estimate of the   24
marginal propensity to consume would be downward biased and so the upper bound for the “real” 
rate of return will be lower than the one we have considered so far. Parker and Skoufias (2000) 
study the program effects on time allocation, concluding that OPORTUNIDADES had no effect on 
adult labor supply. Furthermore, they find no evidence that the program increased leisure time 
amongst men and women in beneficiary households.  
However, OPORTUNIDADES should affect the labor supply of school-age children as it is 
designed to release them from work so that they can attend school. In fact, Parker and Skoufias 
(2000; 2001) do find evidence of changes in children’s labor force participation in salaried and non-
salaried activities, especially for boys; and increases in school attendance. Schultz (2004) also finds 
positive effects on primary and secondary school enrollment for boys and girls.  As explained 
earlier, we control for this potential bias by instrumenting actual transfers with the potential 
transfers.  
5.3.  Fertility Effects 
Fertility decisions may also be affected by program participation. The program might 
generate perverse fertility incentives in order to maximize future transfers received. It might also 
alter the costs and/or benefits of having a child, as well as reduce the cost of fertility control (or 
increase its knowledge and availability). The effect on consumption is thus ambiguous since it will 
depend on household size. Moreover, larger households that receive larger transfer amounts might 
increase consumption through the income effect. Skoufias (2005) summarizes the findings of a 
series of evaluations on OPORTUNIDADES until the end of 1999. He reports no record of 
statistical evidence on fertility rates. In any case, any endogenous fertility responses will be 
accounted for by the use of the potential transfer (computed on baseline household demographics) 
as an instrument for the actual transfer amount received. 
5.4.  Public and Private Transfers 
OPORTUNIDADES transfers might also crowd out private transfers. The reduction in 
these transfers and therefore consumption implies that we would underestimate marginal propensity   25
to consume. Indeed there is some evidence that supports this potential bias. Using only the October 
1998 cross-section collected six months after the intervention, Albarran and Attanasio (2002) find 
that both the likelihood of receiving a private transfer and the amount received -conditional on 
receiving private transfers, are significantly and negatively affected by the program. 
To assess the extent of the potential bias, we have replicated Albarran and Attanasio’s 
results for the 3 periods for which data on private transfers are available (October 1998, November 
1999 and November 2000). First, the amount of private transfers is very small as only 7% of 
households receive a private transfer in any given period.  The estimation results are presented in 
Table 12. Panel AI reports the effect of OPORTUNDADES on receiving any private transfer and 
Panel AII reports the estimated effects on the amount of the private transfer received.  We estimate 
four specifications of the OPORTUNIDADES treatment: in the first row we report the results with 
a OPORTUNIDADES treatment dummy, in the second row we replace the treatment dummy with 
the potential OPORTUNIDADES transfer amount, in the third row we add potential transfers 
squared, and in the fourth row we instrument actual OPORTUNIDADES transfers and actual 
transfers squared with potential transfers and potential transfers squared.  We find that the 
transferred squared models have significant effects, with the marginal effect size falling with the 
transfer amount.  
The same argument could be made for other public transfers.  To test this hypothesis, we 
estimated the effects of OPORTUNIDADES transfers on other public transfers and report the 
results in Panels BI and BII in Table 12.  We find results similar to the private transfer effects.  
 To test the robustness of our main results to the effect of OPORTUNIDADES on private 
and other public transfers, we estimate a variant of the consumption equation (9) by adding private 
and other public transfers to OPORTUNIDADES transfers.  If the coefficients on current transfers 
and lagged cumulative transfers do not change by adding private and other transfers, then we will 
conclude that there is no bias. The results are presented in Panels A and B of Table 13, for private 
and other public transfers respectively. The first column in Panel A, estimates the original   26
specification with only OPORTUNIDADES transfers in equation (9) using the data only from the 
waves that collected both private transfers and other public transfers using potential transfers as the 
instrument. The second column reports the results when private transfers are added to 
OPORTUNIDADES transfers. There is no difference between the estimated coefficients in the two 
models. Column 3 reports the results when we additionally add other public transfers to the 
OPORTUNIDADES and private transfers. Again there are no differences. In Panel B we re-
estimate the specifications in Panel A using only other public transfers. The first column reports the 
base results using only OPORTUNIDADES transfers on data from the waves that collected other 
public transfers.  The second column adds in other public transfers. There is no difference between 
columns 1 and 2 in Panel B. Finally, column 3 controls for whether the family also receives a 
public food basket. Again, the estimated coefficients do not change. These results imply that our 
estimates are not biased due to the exclusion of public and private transfers from the analysis. 
5.5.  Health Effects 
We also test the possibility that beneficiary productivity and consumption increased 
through improvements in health brought on by participation in OPORTUNIDADES.  Panel CI of 
Table 12 estimates the effect of treatment on health, measured by activities of daily living (ADL)
23. 
We show that the program does have small positive effect on health. Given this potential pathway, 
we again estimate our consumption model controlling for health status (ADL) of the head of 
household on a limited sub-sample where health data are available. The results are presented in 
Panel C of Table 13, and again we find that the estimated coefficients on current and cumulative 
lagged transfers do not change controlling for ADLs. This suggests that our main results are not 
biased by not controlling for health. 
5.6.  Length of Benefits Expectations  
                                                 
23 Activity of Daily Living measurements are based on an individuals’ self-rating of ability to engage in 
normal daily activities, including ability to carry out vigorous and moderate activities, ability to carry 
groceries, ability to lift a piece of paper off the ground, ability to walk more than 2km and ability to use the 
bathroom and bathe unassisted.    27
Friedman’s (1957) Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) contended that permanent income 
and not current income was the relevant determinant of consumption, and that permanent 
consumption was proportional to permanent income (the proportionality hypothesis, which implies 
that the permanent income elasticity is unity)
24. Such a model would suggest that the marginal 
propensity to consume out of permanent income should be close to 1, and the marginal propensity 
to consume from transitory income should be close to 0.  The implication of the PIH for our results 
is that if beneficiary households view the transfers as transitory, then they would save most of them; 
if they view them as permanent, then they would consume most of them. 
The proportionality hypothesis and its major implications regarding growth and equity in 
developing countries have been tested many times, with ambiguous results. For example, Bhalla 
(1979) finds an estimated marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income of 0.61 and an 
elasticity of 0.79 (and significantly different from 1) using data from rural India. Wolpin (1982) 
estimates permanent income elasticities in the range of 0.91 to 1.02 for India as well and concludes 
that “whether or not it is unity, the permanent income elasticity of consumption may be closer to 
unity than suggested by previous research”. Musgrove (1979) estimates 0.881 for urban Colombia, 
0.896 for urban Ecuador, and, 0.776 for urban Peru; all significantly different from 1. Finally, 
Paxson (1992) estimates marginal propensities to consume from 0.56 to 0.84 out of permanent 
income, being significantly different from 1; and from 0.17 to 0.27 out of transitory income for rice 
farmers in Thailand.  
Our estimate of the marginal propensity to consume out of current transfers is 0.88. In view 
of the estimated magnitudes of marginal propensities to consume in the development literature, we 
are inclined to think that the rural Mexican households studied here perceive the 
OPORTUNIDADES transfer as a source of permanent income. Indeed, households know that once 
they start receiving the benefit they will continue to receive it for at least 9 years provided they 
                                                 
24 The Modigliani-Brumberg life cycle hypothesis (LCH) reaches analogous conclusions.   28
comply with the program requirements. Thus, their expectations regarding the length of the benefits 
are likely to be rather long term.   
5.7.  Precautionary Savings 
  We have argued that the evidence on farming and micro-enterprise investment responds 
to an alleviation of risk aversion and liquidity and credit constraints by the program. However, in an 
uncertain environment, one might expect households to accumulate wealth to smooth consumption 
over unexpected shocks. This motive is stronger the higher the uncertainty faced by consumers 
(Carroll and Kimball 1996). Moreover, if their banking services are scarce, savings are likely to 
take the form of assets such as land and livestock. For instance, Ravallion and Chen (2005) show 
that much of the impact of an anti-poverty program in Southwest China did not occur through 
consumption, but rather through savings, since participants treated income from the program as 
temporary. If the increase in farm asset ownership, farming and micro-enterprise we observe here is 
due primarily to precautionary savings rather than investment behavior, the expected increases in 
long run living standards may not be sustained if households stop saving when the transfer is 
removed. 
To rule this possibility out, we test for the existence of a precautionary motive and how the 
existence of OPORTUNIDADES affected precautionary savings. We estimate agricultural assets 
(animal ownership and land usage) in 2003 as a function of adverse shocks in the community and 
the accumulated actual transfer amount received by the household. We construct the history of 
shocks from natural causes (principally droughts and plagues) from early 1997 to late 2000 and 
categorize a community as a “high risk area” if it has suffered more than eight shocks during this 
period
25. If there is a precautionary motive, then households in riskier areas (with a larger shock 
history) should have larger investments in agricultural assets in 2003. A dummy for high risk area is 
interacted with the accumulated transfer amount. If beneficiary households are using part of the 
                                                 
25 The number of shocks per community in this period varies from 0 to 13, with a median of 5 shocks and 
an average of 5.41 shocks. The proportion of treatment and control communities in high risk areas is the 
same as the proportion of treatment and control communities in the sample. However, control communities 
tend to report a larger number of shocks than treatment communities.   29
OPORTUNIDADES transfer for precautionary savings the estimated coefficient on this term 
should be positive. The coefficient on accumulated actual transfers, which we instrument with its 
potential counterpart, is simply the “per peso” treatment effect. 
Results are shown in Panel A of Table 14 for a linear specification in transfers and in Panel 
B for a quadratic specification. Production animals and land are the channels of wealth 
accumulation used by these households to ensure their future income. We find that households 
living in riskier areas are more likely to use land and have production animals, suggesting a 
precautionary savings motive.  However, none of the OPORTUNIDADES money is used with 
precautionary motives. In fact, the interaction term is negative and significant for land and 
production animals suggesting that beneficiary households in riskier areas lower their precautionary 
savings. We find a similar effect for draft animals once we introduce a quadratic term for the 
transfer amount. Households in treatment areas may be better insured against future adversities 
because households view the transfer as a permanent source of income. Thus, this analysis rejects 
the precautionary savings hypothesis as an alternative explanation for the investments results.   
6.  Conclusion 
The analysis conducted in this study provides evidence that cash transfer payments from 
the OPORTUNIDADES program increase consumption not only through direct expenditures out of 
current transfers, but also through the income generated from investing part of the transfers in farms 
and micro-enterprises. Beneficiary households experience large increases in participation in micro-
enterprise activities and increased investments in farm assets and agricultural activities. 
Furthermore, households that receive the largest transfers are most likely to invest.  
Conditional cash transfer programs such as OPORTUNIDADES are designed to alleviate 
short-term poverty while investing in the human capital of the next generation. The positive 
benefits of this type of intervention are well established, including increased caloric intake, better 
health and nutrition, and higher school enrollment for children. This increased human capital is 
expected to play an important role in breaking the cycle of poverty for younger generations.   30
However, this paper shows that there are also more immediate implications of cash transfers for 
alleviating long-term poverty for the current generation of beneficiary households. Cash transfers 
have the potential to increase income permanently by facilitating investments in productive 
activities. Furthermore, we argue that the primary mechanisms for achieving this result are through 
reduced liquidity constraints and decreased risk aversion.  
 Although we do not argue that cash transfer programs are necessarily the most desirable 
policy for promoting micro-enterprise or farm investments for poor households in rural areas, it is 
clear that increased entrepreneurial activity brought on by cash transfers have increased the 
potential for self-sufficiency. The results presented here suggest that a permanent rise in 
consumption through increased economic activity may ultimately reduce long-run welfare 
dependence and permit beneficiary households to attain a higher standard of living that can be 
sustained even in the absence of the transfer program. Further understanding of the mechanisms 
through which cash transfers boost productive investments (softening of liquidity and/or credit 
constraints, reduction of risk aversion, insurance role) is crucially important in the determination 
and design of future policies to be undertaken, such as micro-lending, business incentives and 
advising or the provision of insurance schemes, for the alleviation of poverty.   31
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APPENDIX 1 –TABLES 
Table 1: OPORTUNIDADES Monthly Transfer Amounts at Baseline (October 1997)
Transfer Component Level Grade Boys Girls
Education Stipend Primary School 3rd year 60 60
4th year 70 70
5th year 90 90
6th year 120 120
Junior High School 1st year 175 185
2nd year 185 205
3rd year 195 225
High School
1 1st year 470 540
2nd year 505 575
3rd year 535 610
School Supplies Stipend Primary, 1rst payment 80 80
Primary, 2nd payment 40 40
Junior High School 150 150
High School
1 240 240
Nutritional Stipend (per family)
Transfer Cap I (per family)
2





Source: OPORTUNIDADES (www.oportunidades.gob.mx). Transfer amounts adjusted for inflation every semester 
according to the Consumer Price Index published by the Bank of Mexico.
1High school stipends only granted beginning in the second semester of 2001 (July 2001).
2Transfer Cap I is the maximum transfer amount awarded for basic education (primary school and junior high) and nutrition.




Table 2: Sample Sizes and Take-Up Rates
1
N % N% N%
Sample of Eligible (Poor) Households
Number Non Take-Up Households 839 10.96 485 10.44 1324 10.76
Number Take-Up Households (Actually Treated -TOT)   6,819 89.04 4,159 89.56 10,978 89.24
Total Number of Households (Intent to Treat -ITT) 7,658 4,644 12,302
Number of Communities 320 63.24 186 36.76 506
1Take-up control households have received at least one bimonthly payment by the time all eligible households should have 
been incorporated (November 2000). Take-up treatment households must have received their first payment before any eligible 
control household is phased into the program (November 1999).
2We drop 116 households that receive a total transfer amount higher than the maximum they could have potentially received 
according to their household demographics and treatment status. Households with heads and/or head's spouses younger than 
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Table 3A: Test of Equality of Means between Potential Treatments and Potential Controls Prior to Program Implementation
                 Sub-Sample of Original Poor at Baseline (October 1997) -Intent to Treat (ITT)
N Mean SD N Mean SD t-stat
Intent to Treat Sub-Sample (ITT) -Explanatory Variables
Head's Characteristics
Age Household Head 7655 41.95 14.133 4643 42.33 14.521 -0.943
Female Head =1 7658 8.16 0.274 4644 8.40 0.277 -0.377
Indigenous Head =1 7646 41.90 0.493 4636 43.70 0.496 -0.324
Head's Education (Years) 5249 4.06 2.306 3143 3.95 2.250 1.148
Never Attended School (Head of Household) =1 7634 31.44 0.464 4637 32.65 0.469 -0.541
Primary School Not Completed (Head of Household) =1 7634 46.28 0.499 4637 46.75 0.499 -0.275
Primary School Completed (Head of Household) =1 7634 16.94 0.375 4637 15.59 0.363 0.988
More than Primary School (Head of Household) =1 7634 5.34 0.225 4637 5.00 0.218 0.516
Spouse's Characteristics
Age Spouse of Head 6713 36.27 12.225 4074 36.17 12.223 0.296
Spouse's Education (Years) 4291 4.16 2.124 2551 4.21 2.243 -0.603
Never Attended School (Head's Spouse) =1 6700 36.18 0.481 4067 37.35 0.484 -0.411
Primary School Not Completed (Head's Spouse) =1 6700 41.64 0.493 4067 40.69 0.491 0.477
Primary School Completed (Head's Spouse) =1 6700 18.37 0.387 4067 16.97 0.375 0.986
More than Primary School (Head's Spouse) =1 6700 3.81 0.191 4067 4.99 0.218 -1.953+
Main Entrepreneur's Characteristics
Age Main Entrepreneur in the Household 823 0.53 0.499 338 0.54 0.499 -0.178
Education Years Main Entrepreneur in the Household 818 0.35 0.477 335 0.36 0.480 -0.208
Female Main Entrepreneur in the Household =1 818 2.78 2.771 335 2.61 2.582 0.676
Main Entrepreneur is the (likely) Beneficiary Mother =1 822 40.29 13.919 338 40.25 14.299 0.040
Household Characteristics
Presence of Children 0 to 7 =1 7645 75.36 0.431 4639 77.04 0.421 -1.396
Presence of Children 8 to 17 =1 7645 69.01 0.462 4639 69.54 0.460 -0.472
Presence of Adult Men 18 to 54 =1 7645 83.69 0.369 4639 83.75 0.369 -0.057
Presence of Adult Female 18 to 54 =1 7645 90.26 0.297 4639 90.80 0.289 -0.699
Presence of Adults Older than 55 =1 7644 27.00 0.444 4639 27.20 0.445 -0.177
Household Size 7658 5.91 2.433 4644 5.94 2.413 -0.457
Home Ownership =1 7655 93.39 0.248 4643 92.10 0.270 1.488
Dirt Floor =1 7641 73.17 0.443 4630 75.72 0.429 -1.015
Electricity =1 7653 57.65 0.494 4642 60.58 0.489 -0.684
No Agricultural Assets =1 7634 10.40 0.305 4629 11.67 0.321 -1.047
Landless Farms =1 7634 10.40 0.305 4629 11.67 0.321 -1.047
Small Landed Farms =1 7634 30.59 0.461 4629 32.45 0.468 -0.828
Big Farms  =1 7634 46.86 0.499 4629 40.94 0.492 2.229*
7634 12.16 0.327 4629 14.95 0.357 -1.876
Community Characteristics
Village Associations (Community Work) 7658 87.84 0.327 4644 87.75 0.328 0.021
Minimum Distance to Large Urban Centre (Km) 7658 107.73 41.361 4644 105.11 43.721 0.522
Monthly Community Agricultural Male Wage 4426 573.86 172.005 2781 585.23 172.115 -0.463
Treatment Group Control Group
Notes: +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%.T-stat of differences in means computed clustering SE at the community level. Mean 
of dichotomous variables expressed in percentages.   
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Table 3B: Test of Equality of Means between Actual Treatments and Actual Controls Prior to Program Implementation
                  Sub-Sample of Original Poor at Baseline (October 1997) -Treatment on the Treated (TOT)
N Mean SD N Mean SD t-stat
Treatment on the Treated Sub-Sample (TOT) 
-Explanatory Variables
Head's Characteristics
Age Household Head 6818 42.01 13.898 4158 42.49 14.381 -1.140
Female Head =1 6819 7.86 0.269 4159 7.89 0.270 -0.042
Indigenous Head =1 6809 41.72 0.493 4151 43.97 0.496 -0.403
Head's Education (Years) 4745 4.03 2.268 2841 3.91 2.206 1.275
Never Attended School (Head of Household) =1 6797 30.38 0.460 4154 32.04 0.467 -0.796
Primary School Not Completed (Head of Household) =1 6797 47.21 0.499 4154 47.64 0.500 -0.257
Primary School Completed (Head of Household) =1 6797 17.18 0.377 4154 15.53 0.362 1.172
More than Primary School (Head of Household) =1 6797 5.22 0.223 4154 4.79 0.214 0.668
Spouse's Characteristics
Age Spouse of Head 6037 36.43 12.114 3693 36.47 12.120 -0.111
Spouse's Education (Years) 3917 4.12 2.090 2322 4.15 2.160 -0.287
Never Attended School (Head's Spouse) =1 6027 35.26 0.478 3687 37.08 0.483 -0.669
Primary School Not Completed (Head's Spouse) =1 6027 42.49 0.494 3687 41.58 0.493 0.464
Primary School Completed (Head's Spouse) =1 6027 18.57 0.389 3687 16.79 0.374 1.235
More than Primary School (Head's Spouse) =1 6027 3.68 0.188 3687 4.56 0.209 -1.451
Main Entrepreneur's Characteristics
Age Main Entrepreneur in the Household 760 40.38 13.964 318 40.42 14.405 -0.035
Education Years Main Entrepreneur in the Household 757 2.77 2.764 315 2.64 2.555 0.519
Female Main Entrepreneur in the Household =1 761 53.35 0.499 318 53.77 0.499 -0.061
Main Entrepreneur is the (likely) Beneficiary Mother =1 757 35.54 0.479 315 35.87 0.480 -0.069
Household Characteristics
Presence of Children 0 to 7 =1 6810 75.89 0.428 4157 77.24 0.419 -1.101
Presence of Children 8 to 17 =1 6810 70.47 0.456 4157 70.99 0.454 -0.435
Presence of Adult Men 18 to 54 =1 6810 84.33 0.364 4157 84.44 0.363 -0.103
Presence of Adult Female 18 to 54 =1 6810 91.17 0.284 4157 91.46 0.280 -0.378
Presence of Adults Older than 55 =1 6810 26.77 0.443 4157 27.54 0.447 -0.662
Household Size 6819 6.00 2.416 4159 6.04 2.405 -0.583
Home Ownership =1 6816 93.87 0.240 4158 92.83 0.258 1.199
Dirt Floor =1 6803 72.59 0.446 4145 75.49 0.430 -1.116
Electricity =1 6815 58.94 0.492 4158 61.21 0.487 -0.529
No Agricultural Assets =1 6798 9.55 0.294 4145 10.78 0.310 -1.012
Landless Farms =1 6798 30.77 0.462 4145 32.06 0.467 -0.570
Small Landed Farms =1 6798 47.16 0.499 4145 42.17 0.494 1.84+
Big Farms  =1 6798 12.52 0.331 4145 14.98 0.357 -1.685
Community Characteristics
Village Associations (Community Work) 6819 89.18 0.311 4159 87.21 0.334 0.432
Minimum Distance to Large Urban Centre (Km) 6819 107.53 41.857 4159 105.06 43.780 0.486
Monthly Community Agricultural Male Wage 4006 573.79 170.117 2498 579.80 163.320 -0.249
Treatment Group Control Group
Notes: +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%.T-stat of differences in means computed clustering SE at the community level. Mean 
of dichotomous variables expressed in percentages.   
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Table 4: Exogeneity Test and Average Treatment Effect  -Test of Equality of Means between Actual Treatments and Actual Controls 
               Sub-Sample of Original Poor  -Treatment on the Treated (TOT)
N Mean  SD N Mean SD t-stat
A. Exogeneity Test -Dependent Variables at Baseline (1997)
AI. Entire Sub-Sample
Draft Animals Ownership 6819 35.15 0.477 4159 32.53 0.469 1.109
Production Animals Ownership 6817 81.90 0.385 4158 82.56 0.379 -0.376
Land Use 6819 59.77 0.490 4159 57.30 0.495 0.856
Number Draft Animals† 2391 0.98 1.999 1350 0.89 1.422 0.874
Number Production Animals† 5576 1.25 2.281 3425 1.23 2.356 0.236
Number Hectares Used† 4057 2.68 2.759 2370 2.94 2.851 -1.564
AIII. Landless Households in 97 =1
Draft Animals Ownership 2092 26.00 0.439 1329 22.72 0.419 1.285
Production Animals Ownership 2092 96.99 0.171 1329 97.07 0.169 -0.097
Number Draft Animals† 543 0.75 2.714 301 0.56 0.913 1.437
Number Production Animals† 2026 0.76 1.494 1287 0.70 1.448 0.796
AIV. Smaller Farms in 97 =1 
Draft Animals Ownership 3206 41.08 0.492 1748 39.59 0.489 0.452
Production Animals Ownership 3206 85.90 0.348 1748 88.39 0.320 -1.288
Number Draft Animals† 1313 0.97 1.604 691 0.89 1.484 0.689
Number Production Animals† 2752 1.20 1.976 1541 1.18 2.086 0.168
Number Hectares Used† 3206 1.60 0.749 1748 1.66 0.749 -1.472
AV. Bigger Farms in 97 =1
Draft Animals Ownership 851 61.46 0.487 621 56.52 0.496 1.191
Production Animals Ownership 851 91.89 0.273 621 94.36 0.231 -1.602
Number Draft Animals† 522 1.22 1.998 351 1.16 1.562 0.330
Number Production Animals† 780 2.68 3.760 585 2.41 3.579 0.851
Number Hectares Used† 851 6.74 3.654 621 6.53 3.454 0.664
B. Average Treatment Effect -Dependent Variables Oct 98 to Nov 99
BI. Entire Sub-Sample
Draft Animals Ownership =1 19406 29.19 0.455 11805 24.88 0.432 2.013*
Production Animals Ownership =1 19406 74.81 0.434 11805 70.99 0.454 2.115*
Land Use =1 19409 61.62 0.486 11805 59.06 0.492 0.998
Number of Draft Animals† 5641 0.66 1.070 2928 0.62 0.994 0.658
Number of Production Animals† 14490 1.02 1.951 8357 0.90 1.829 1.437
Number of Hectares Used† 11886 2.10 2.182 6928 2.10 2.171 -0.009
Household has a Micro-Enterprise =1 19409 8.48 0.279 11805 5.85 0.235 1.855+
Household has a Female Micro-Enterprise =1 19409 8.11 0.273 11805 5.13 0.221 2.217*
BII. No Agricultural Assets Households in 97 =1
Draft Animals Ownership =1 1814 7.55 0.264 1212 9.16 0.289 -0.937
Production Animals Ownership =1 1814 50.88 0.500 1212 42.16 0.494 2.862**
Land Use =1 1816 27.75 0.448 1212 22.03 0.415 1.719+
Number of Draft Animals† 137 0.41 0.580 110 0.34 0.266 1.008
Number of Production Animals† 921 0.41 0.901 510 0.37 0.803 0.453
Number of Hectares Used† 503 1.25 1.403 264 1.36 1.369 -0.854
Household has a Micro-Enterprise =1 1816 7.21 0.259 1212 4.37 0.205 1.203
Household has a Female Micro-Enterprise =1 1816 6.77 0.251 1212 3.63 0.187 1.395
BIII. Landless Households in 97 =1
Draft Animals Ownership =1 5908 24.68 0.431 3768 19.03 0.393 2.438**
Production Animals Ownership =1 5908 75.00 0.433 3768 72.03 0.449 1.496
Land Use =1 5908 41.22 0.492 3768 36.73 0.482 1.683+
Number of Draft Animals† 1451 0.49 0.888 714 0.44 0.606 1.166
Number of Production Animals† 4426 0.77 1.454 2706 0.64 1.316 1.767+
Number of Hectares Used† 2425 1.61 1.860 1379 1.55 1.580 0.653
Household has a Micro-Enterprise =1 5908 8.26 0.275 3768 5.52 0.228 1.761+
Household has a Female Micro-Enterprise =1 5908 7.97 0.271 3768 4.99 0.218 1.949*
BIV. Smaller Farms in 97 =1 
Draft Animals Ownership =1 9171 31.21 0.463 5004 27.26 0.445 1.369
Production Animals Ownership =1 9171 76.91 0.421 5004 73.90 0.439 1.343
Land Use =1 9172 75.44 0.430 5004 76.08 0.427 -0.321
Number of Draft Animals† 2847 0.68 1.126 1359 0.58 0.792 1.669+
Number of Production Animals† 7046 1.03 1.847 3688 0.87 1.660 1.666+
Number of Hectares Used 6887 1.90 1.903 3798 1.81 1.595 1.121
Household has a Micro-Enterprise =1 9172 8.93 0.285 5004 6.10 0.239 1.579
Household has a Female Micro-Enterprise =1 9172 8.50 0.279 5004 5.14 0.221 1.996*
BV. Bigger Farms in 97 =1
Draft Animals Ownership =1 2451 48.51 0.500 1784 40.81 0.492 1.994*
Production Animals Ownership =1 2451 83.92 0.367 1784 79.88 0.401 1.804+
Land Use =1 2451 83.80 0.369 1784 83.02 0.376 0.379
Number of Draft Animals† 1187 0.83 1.103 728 0.87 1.351 -0.307
Number of Production Animals† 2043 1.77 2.953 1423 1.62 2.770 0.690
Number of Hectares Used 2027 3.56 2.832 1460 3.50 3.178 0.213
Household has a Micro-Enterprise =1 2451 8.08 0.273 1784 7.01 0.255 0.891
Household has a Female Micro-Enterprise =1 2451 7.79 0.268 1784 6.56 0.248 1.041
Notes:  +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. T-stat of differences in means computed clustering SE at the community level. Mean of dichotomous variables 
expressed in percentages. Smaller farms are landed households using, at least, 3 Ha. of land; bigger farms use more than 3 Ha. Number of draft or production animals are expressed in 
equivalent cow units. †Continuous variables conditional on being positive. 
Treatment Group Control Group
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Table 5: Effect of OPORTUNIDADES on Agricultural Investments -Treatment and Control Variation 
               Sub-sample of Original Poor Households in October 1998, May 1999 and November 1999 -Intent to Treat (ITT) and Actual Treatments (TOT)




















Model A: ITT -no controls
Treatment Status  0.043* 0.025+ 0.038* 0.065* 0.029 0.053*
(0.021) (0.013) (0.018) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026)
Model B: TOT -no controls
Treatment Status  0.043* 0.024+ 0.039* 0.062* 0.026 0.050+
(0.021) (0.013) (0.018) (0.029) (0.026) (0.027)
Model C: ITT -controls
Treatment Status  0.046** 0.023* 0.037* 0.061* 0.028 0.053*
(0.018) (0.011) (0.016) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025)
Model D: TOT -controls
Treatment Status  0.044* 0.022* 0.037* 0.062* 0.028 0.052*
(0.017) (0.011) (0.017) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025)
Model E: TOT by Farm Size at Baseline (1997) -controls
Treatment Status * No Agricultural Assets  -0.009 -0.008 0.075** 0.094** 0.063+ 0.065+
(0.034) (0.019) (0.022) (0.033) (0.038) (0.039)
Treatment Status * Landless  0.065* 0.035* 0.029+ 0.096 0.045+ 0.049+
(0.026) (0.017) (0.018) (0.075) (0.025) (0.025)
Treatment Status * Smaller Farm 0.038+ 0.029+ 0.028 -0.003 -0.002 -
(0.022) (0.016) (0.020) (0.041) (0.025) -
Treatment Status * Bigger Farm 0.046 0.000 0.035 0.007 0.026 -
(0.028) (0.022) (0.023) (0.083) (0.032) -
Observations ITT Sub-Sample (Model A and C) 33313 21899 33313 5964 33316 13641
Mean Dependent Variable ITT Sub-Sample (All) 0.275 0.124 0.729 0.494 0.605 0.360
Mean Dependent Variable ITT Sub-Sample (Controls) 0.248 0.108 0.706 0.453 0.588 0.329
Observations TOT Sub-Sample (Models B, D, E) 31211 20477 31211 5457 31214 12708
Mean Dependent Variable TOT Sub-Sample (All) 0.276 0.123 0.734 0.500 0.606 0.361
Mean Dependent Variable TOT Sub-Sample (Controls) 0.248 0.109 0.710 0.461 0.591 0.332




























Model A: ITT -no controls
Treatment Status  0.030 0.056 0.086 0.103 0.031 0.008
(0.025) (0.035) (0.075) (0.080) (0.089) (0.115)
Model B: TOT -no controls
Treatment Status  0.029 0.058 0.090 0.103 0.036 0.023
(0.025) (0.037) (0.072) (0.076) (0.091) (0.117)
Model C: ITT -controls
Treatment Status  0.030 0.060+ 0.084 0.099 0.026 0.014
(0.022) (0.033) (0.067) (0.071) (0.084) (0.112)
Model D: TOT -controls
Treatment Status  0.031 0.062+ 0.092 0.100 0.038 0.031
(0.023) (0.034) (0.065) (0.068) (0.086) (0.113)
Model E: TOT by Farm Size at Baseline (1997) -controls
Treatment Status * No Agricultural Assets  0.005 - 0.022 - 0.047 -
(0.030) - (0.082) - (0.090) -
Treatment Status * Landless  0.019 0.017 0.012 0.007 0.060 -
(0.024) (0.047) (0.066) (0.070) (0.070) -
Treatment Status * Smaller Farm 0.071** 0.078* 0.119+ 0.125+ 0.036 0.055
(0.023) (0.038) (0.064) (0.069) (0.068) (0.097)
Treatment Status * Bigger Farm 0.088** 0.112* 0.234** 0.291** 0.162* 0.182
(0.028) (0.046) (0.076) (0.083) (0.082) (0.111)
Observations ITT Sub-Sample (Model A and C) 33313 11385 33313 27301 33193 19573
Mean Dependent Variable ITT Sub-Sample (All) 0.176 0.403 0.722 0.825 1.265 1.763
Mean Dependent Variable ITT Sub-Sample (Controls) 0.152 0.367 0.651 0.741 1.239 1.790
Observations TOT Sub-Sample (Models B, D, E) 31211 10707 31211 25708 31097 18406
Mean Dependent Variable TOT Sub-Sample (All) 0.152 0.367 0.639 0.725 1.240 1.780
Mean Dependent Variable TOT Sub-Sample  (Controls) 0.176 0.403 0.715 0.815 1.273 1.767
Notes: +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE in parantheses. For the probit models, marginal effects and robust standard errors reported, clustered at the community level. LS 
regressions include community level random effects. All regressions include wave dummies. Controls in models C to E include: head's and spouse's  age, age squared and education level dummies, 
head's ethnicity (language), household size, dummies controlling for household demographics, baseline assets (home ownership, dirt floor and electricity) and community characteristics (community 
organizations, distance to urban center and wages). Model E controls for farm size in October 1997 (baseline). Smaller farms use up to 3 Ha. of land; bigger farms use more than 3 Ha.  
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Table 6: Effect of OPORTUNIDADES on Micro-Entepreneurial Investments -Treatment and Control Variation. 
               Sub-sample of Original Poor Households in October 1998,  May 1999 and November 1999 






Model A: ITT -no controls
Treatment Status  0.026+ 0.030*
(0.014) (0.013)
Model B: TOT -no controls
Treatment Status  0.025+ 0.028*
(0.014) (0.013)
Model C: ITT -controls
Treatment Status  0.029* 0.031**
(0.012) (0.012)
Model D: TOT -controls
Treatment Status  0.028* 0.030**
(0.012) (0.011)
Observations ITT Sub-Sample (Model A and C) 33316 33316
Mean Dependent Variable ITT Sub-Sample (All) 0.076 0.071
Mean Dependent Variable ITT Sub-Sample (Controls) 0.058 0.051
Observations TOT Sub-Sample (Models B and D) 31214 31214
Mean Dependent Variable TOT Sub-Sample (All) 0.075 0.070
Mean Dependent Variable TOT Sub-Sample (Controls) 0.059 0.051
Notes: +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE in parentheses. Marginal effects and robust standard errors 
reported, clustered at the community level. All regressions include wave dummies. Controls in models C and D include head's and 
spouse's age, age squared and education level dummies, head's ethnicity (language), household size, dummies controlling for 
household demographics, baseline assets (home ownership, dirt floor and electricity) and community characteristics (community 
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Table 7: Effect of OPORTUNIDADES on Agricultural Investments by Quintiles of Cumulative Transfer (Potential and Actual)
               Sub-sample of Original Poor Households from October 1998 through November 2003 -Treatment on the Treated (TOT)





I. DRAFT ANIMALS OWNERSHIP (PROBIT)
Model A TOT -Controls, Potential Transfer 0.023 0.035+ 0.041+ 0.057* 0.066+ 51327 0.286
Treatment Status * Quintile (0.015) (0.020) (0.022) (0.028) (0.034)
Model B: TOT -Controls, Actual Transfer
Treatment Status * Quintile 0.014 0.044* 0.045* 0.055* 0.076* 51327 0.286
(0.015) (0.020) (0.023) (0.027) (0.034)
Model C: TOT -Controls, Actual Transfer p(y|y 97 =0)
Treatment Status * Quintile 0.008 0.019 0.026 0.036+ 0.058* 33649 0.136
(0.010) (0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.027)
Model D: TOT by Farm Size in 97 -Controls, Actual Transfer p(y|y 97 =0)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * No Agricultural Assets  -0.008 -0.011 -0.005 0.019 0.053 33649 0.136
(0.016) (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) (0.035)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Landless  0.020 0.031+ 0.051* 0.055* 0.062+
(0.014) (0.019) (0.024) (0.025) (0.033)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Smaller Farm  0.010 0.028 0.024 0.038+ 0.064*
(0.014) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023) (0.031)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Bigger Farm -0.002 -0.008 0.000 0.005 0.050
(0.018) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.035)
II. PRODUCTION ANIMALS OWNERSHIP (PROBIT)
Model A: TOT -Controls, Potential Transfer
Treatment Status * Quintile -0.015 0.015 0.030+ 0.057** 0.065** 51333 0.741
(0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.023)
Model B: TOT -Controls, Actual Transfer
Treatment Status * Quintile -0.016 0.019 0.027 0.054** 0.079** 51333 0.741
(0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023)
Model C: TOT -Controls, Actual Transfer p(y|y 97 =0)
Treatment Status * Quintile 0.018 0.057* 0.062 0.111* 0.166** 8924 0.524
(0.024) (0.029) (0.038) (0.048) (0.057)
Model D: TOT by Farm Size in 97 -Controls, Actual Transfer p(y|y 97 =0)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * No Agricultural Assets  0.037 0.098** 0.070+ 0.163** 0.197** 8924 0.524
(0.026) (0.034) (0.041) (0.045) (0.051)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Landless  -0.051 0.004 0.048 0.127 0.085
(0.077) (0.079) (0.104) (0.088) (0.121)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Smaller Farm  -0.011 0.002 0.022 0.021 0.131*
(0.036) (0.041) (0.052) (0.062) (0.063)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Bigger Farm -0.010 -0.059 0.119 0.071 0.139
(0.078) (0.082) (0.094) (0.097) (0.118)
III. LAND USE (PROBIT)
Model A: TOT -Controls, Potential Transfer
Treatment Status * Quintile 0.006 0.023 0.024 0.033 0.040 51390 0.619
(0.020) (0.025) (0.027) (0.031) (0.035)
Model B: TOT -Controls, Actual Transfer
Treatment Status * Quintile 0.009 0.015 0.027 0.039 0.062+ 51390 0.619
(0.020) (0.025) (0.028) (0.030) (0.033)
Model C: TOT -Controls, Actual Transfer p(y|y 97 =0)
Treatment Status * Quintile 0.033 0.045 0.064+ 0.064+ 0.098* 20868 0.387
(0.021) (0.028) (0.033) (0.036) (0.044)
Model D: TOT by Farm Size in 97 -Controls, Actual Transfer p(y|y 97 =0)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * No Agricultural Assets  0.049 0.058 0.093* 0.043 0.116* 20868 0.387
(0.032) (0.040) (0.046) (0.046) (0.054)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Landless  0.031 0.041 0.056+ 0.065+ 0.090*
(0.022) (0.028) (0.034) (0.036) (0.044)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Smaller Farm  - - - - -
--- - -
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Bigger Farm - - - - -
--- - -  
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Table 7 -continued





IV. NUMBER OF EQUIVALENT DRAFT ANIMALS (LS)
Model A: TOT -Controls, Potential Transfer
Treatment Status * Quintile 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.034 51327 0.217
(0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.022) (0.028)
Model B: TOT -Controls, Actual Transfer
Treatment Status * Quintile 0.007 0.007 0.025 0.013 0.058* 51327 0.217
(0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.027)
Model C: TOT -Controls, Actual Transfer p(y|y 97 >0)
Treatment Status * Quintile 0.019 0.019 0.040 0.048 0.137* 17638 0.467
(0.032) (0.035) (0.039) (0.043) (0.055)
Model D: TOT by Farm Size in 97 -Controls, Actual Transfer p(y|y 97 >0)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * No Agricultural Assets  - - - - - 17638 0.467
--- - -
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Landless  0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.039 0.110
(0.059) (0.063) (0.068) (0.068) (0.075)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Smaller Farm  0.012 0.013 0.042 0.061 0.110+
(0.041) (0.044) (0.048) (0.050) (0.060)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Bigger Farm 0.040 0.037 0.085 0.093 0.175*
(0.058) (0.062) (0.066) (0.065) (0.071)
V. NUMBER OF EQUIVALENT PRODUCTION ANIMALS (LS)
Model A: TOT -Controls, Potential Transfer
Treatment Status * Quintile 0.017 0.063+ 0.072* 0.147** 0.164** 51333 0.740
(0.028) (0.033) (0.036) (0.043) (0.053)
Model B: TOT -Controls, Actual Transfer
Treatment Status * Quintile 0.029 0.032 0.104** 0.181** 0.193** 51333 0.740
(0.028) (0.033) (0.038) (0.042) (0.052)
Model C: TOT -Controls, Actual Transfer p(y|y 97 >0)
Treatment Status * Quintile 0.038 0.039 0.113** 0.187** 0.187** 42335 0.837
(0.032) (0.038) (0.043) (0.048) (0.060)
Model D: TOT by Farm Size in 97 -Controls, Actual Transfer p(y|y 97 >0)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * No Agricultural Assets  - - - - - 42335 0.837
--- - -
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Landless  0.009 0.005 0.049 0.073 0.109
(0.047) (0.053) (0.059) (0.061) (0.070)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Smaller Farm  0.049 0.025 0.127* 0.196** 0.185**
(0.043) (0.048) (0.052) (0.056) (0.065)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Bigger Farm 0.010 0.172* 0.237** 0.410** 0.344**
(0.070) (0.076) (0.080) (0.078) (0.084)
VI. NUMBER OF HECTARES (LS)
Model A: TOT -Controls, Potential Transfer
Treatment Status * Quintile 0.121* 0.155* 0.136* 0.205** 0.048 51103 1.481
(0.053) (0.062) (0.067) (0.079) (0.099)
Model B: TOT -Controls, Actual Transfer
Treatment Status * Quintile 0.135** 0.125* 0.140* 0.247** 0.114 51103 1.481
(0.052) (0.062) (0.070) (0.078) (0.097)
Model C: TOT -Controls, Actual Transfer p(y|y 97 >0)
Treatment Status * Quintile 0.154* 0.127 0.137 0.260** 0.093 30314 1.965
(0.070) (0.081) (0.091) (0.100) (0.125)
Model D: TOT by Farm Size in 97 -Controls, Actual Transfer p(y|y 97 >0)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * No Agricultural Assets  - - - - - 30314 1.965
--- - -
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Landless  - - - - -
--- - -
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Smaller Farm  0.124 0.123 0.140 0.224* -0.015
(0.076) (0.086) (0.095) (0.104) (0.126)
Treatment Status *  Quintile * Bigger Farm 0.223+ 0.094 0.113 0.262+ 0.323*
(0.126) (0.137) (0.145) (0.144) (0.158)
Notes: +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE in parentheses. For the probit models, marginal effects and robust standard errors reported, clustered at the 
community level. LS regressions include community level random effects. All regressions include wave dummies and controls for head's and spouse's  age, age squared and education 
level dummies, head's ethnicity (language), household size, dummies controlling for household demographics, baseline assets (home ownership, dirt floor and electricity) and community 
characteristics (community organizations, distance to urban center and wages).Data are for the five waves for which we have data on the dependent variables: October 1998, May 1999, 
November 1999, May 2000 and November 2003. Smaller farms use up to 3 Ha. of land; bigger farms use more than 3 Ha.   
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Table 8: Consumption and Transfer Amounts  -Test of Equality of Means between Actual Treatments and Actual Controls.
               Sub-Sample of Original Poor from October 1998 to May 1999
1 -Treatment on the Treated (TOT)
N Mean  SD N  Mean SD t-stat
I. Entire Sub-Sample
Monthly Consumption per Capita (Home Production Included)  12667 194.09 96.597 7710 171.91 93.004 4.900
Actual Monthly Transfer per Capita  12667 36.35 21.528 - - - -
6-month Lagged Actual Cumulated Transfer per Capita 12667 141.33 123.927 - - - -
Potential Monthly Transfer per Capita 12667 48.61 26.256 - - - -
6-month Lagged Potential Cumulated Transfer per Capita  12667 216.64 187.569 - - - -
II. No Agricultural Assets Households in 97 =1
Monthly Consumption per Capita (Home Production Included) 1187 215.02 106.803 785 190.92 102.052 3.203
III. Landless Households in 97 =1
Monthly Consumption per Capita (Home Production Included) 3864 199.84 95.667 2463 182.24 93.550 3.268
IV. Smaller Farms in 97 =1 
Monthly Consumption per Capita (Home Production Included) 5986 187.69 94.076 3284 160.99 90.104 5.213
V. Bigger Farms in 97 =1 
Monthly Consumption per Capita (Home Production Included) 1592 189.29 97.530 1154 167.67 88.754 3.046
Treatment Group Control Group
Notes: T-stat of differences in means computed clustering SE at the community level. All consumption values are expressed in per capita adult equivalent units. 
Smaller farms are landed households using less than 3 Ha. of land; bigger farms use more than 3 Ha.




Table 9: Effect of Current Transfers (Marginal Propensity to Consume) and Lagged Cumulative Transfers on Consumption














Actual Transfer (monthly pc ae) -Preferences 0.649** 0.510** 0.733** 0.884**
(0.020) (0.022) (0.034) (0.035)
Actual Cumulative Transfer (6 months lag pc ae) -Productivity 0.011** 0.012** 0.018**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Full Set of Controls N N N Y
Number of Observations 39529 39529 39529 39529
Mean of Dependent Variable (All) 186.598 186.598 186.598 186.598
Mean of Dependent Variable (Controls) 176.070 176.070 176.070 176.070
Notes: +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE in parentheses. All regressions include random effects at the community level and wave dummies. The 
full list of controls additionally includes: head's and spouse's age, education level dummies, head's ethnicity (language), household size adult equivalent and household 
demographic variables, baseline assets (home ownership, dirt floor and electricity), farm size at baseline and community characteristics (community organizations, distance to 
urban center and wages). The excluded instruments in the 2SLS models are the monthly pc ae potential transfer and the 6-month lag cumulative potential pc ae transfer. The 
first stages show significant effects of the excluded instruments on the endogeneous explanatory variables and are available upon request. Consumption is expenditures 
expressed in per capita adult equivalent units and includes home production. Outliers trimmed at the top and bottom 1% of both the consumption and transfer distributions. pc 
means "per capita"; ae means "adult equivalent". 
1Because of the inclusion of home production, we only have data on consumption for the following rounds: October 1998, May 1999, Nov 2000 and Nov 2003.
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Table 10: Consumption -Heterogeneous Treatment Effects



















by Head and 
Household 
Characteristics
Actual Transfer (monthly pc ae) -Preferences
Linear (Alone) 0.886** 0.868** 1.094** 1.073** 0.872** 1.277**
(0.035) (0.038) (0.261) (0.055) (0.034) (0.288)
Interacted with Non Agricultural Household at Baseline (1997) =1 0.181* 0.166+
(0.090) (0.091)
Interacted with Bigger Farm at Baseline (1997) =1 0.020 0.0001
(0.078) (0.078)
Interacted with Head's Age -0.017 -0.018+
(0.011) (0.011)
Interacted with Head's Age Squared 0.0002* 0.0002*
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Interacted with Head has not completed primary =1 -0.251** -0.170*
(0.064) (0.069)
Interacted with Head has completed primary or more =1 -0.304** -0.194*
(0.077) (0.090)
Actual Cumulative Transfer (6 months lag pc ae) -Productivity
Linear (Alone) 0.018** 0.018** 0.009* 0.016** 0.028** 0.015**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
Interacted with Non Agricultural Household at Baseline (1997) =1 -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Interacted with Bigger Farm at Baseline (1997) =1 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
Interacted with Head's Age 0.0004** 0.0004**
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Interacted with Head's Age Squared -5.35*10-6** -5.30*10-6**
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Interacted with Head has Not Completed Primary =1 0.003** 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001)
Interacted with Head has Completed Primary or More =1 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Interacted with Min Distance to Urban Center (/100) -0.009** -0.009**
(0.001) (0.001)
F u l l  S e t  o f  C o n t r o l s YY YY YY
Number of Observations 39529 39529 39529 39529 39529 39529
Mean of Dependent Variable (All) 186.598 186.598 186.598 186.598 186.598 186.598
Mean of Dependent Variable (Controls) 176.070 176.070 176.070 176.070 176.070 176.070
Notes: +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE in parentheses. All regressions include random effects at the community level and the following controls: wave 
dummies, head's and spouse's age, education level dummies, head's ethnicity (language), household size adult equivalent and household demographic variables, baseline assets (home 
ownership, dirt floor and electricity), farm size at baseline and community characteristics (community organizations, distance to urban center and wages). Main effects of the controls added 
for those specifications with interactions. The excluded instruments are the monthly pc ae potential transfer, the 6-month lag cumulative potential pc ae transfer and its respectives 
interactions, depending on the specification. The first stages show significant effects of the excluded instruments on the endogeneous explanatory variables and are available upon 
request. Consumption is expenditures expressed in per capita adult equivalent units and includes home production. Outliers trimmed at the top and bottom 1% of both the consumption 
and transfer distributions. pc means "per capita"; ae means "adult equivalent". Landless and smaller farms are the omitted farm size categories; no education is the omitted education 
category. 
1Because of the inclusion of home production, we only have data on consumption for the following rounds: October 1998, May 1999, Nov 2000 and Nov 2003.    43
Table 11: Are there Price Effects? Testing for Macro Income and Price Effects
                  Sub-sample of Ineligibles (Non-Poor) Households in October 1998, May 1999 and November 1999 -Intent to Treat (ITT)
N Mean SD N Mean SD t-stat
A. Raw Means -no controls
AI. Agricultural Investments 
Draft Animal Ownership  9053 37.23 0.483 5805 35.47 0.478 0.654
Number of Equivalent Draft Animals† 3341 0.90 1.523 2047 0.87 1.252 0.320
Production Animal Ownership  9054 75.99 0.427 5805 75.23 0.432 0.447
Number of Production Animals† 6858 1.98 3.334 4345 1.98 3.389 0.005
Land Ownership 9054 65.66 0.475 5806 64.74 0.478 0.423
Hectars of Land Used† 5819 2.98 3.000 3703 3.19 3.005 -0.975
AII. Micro-Enterprise Investments 
Micro-Enterprise 9054 9.21 0.289 5806 8.01 0.271 1.068
Female Micro-Enterprise 9054 8.92 0.285 5806 7.34 0.261 1.477
AIII. Consumption
1
Monthly Consumption per Capita (Home Production Included)† 6155 261.74 197.939 3874 255.97 198.147 0.729
AIV. Community Wages
Monthly Male Agricultural Wage† 860 605.13 202.668 488 613.94 195.336 -0.520
Monthly Female Agricultural Wage† 364 534.53 191.883 197 516.00 188.584 0.884
Monthly Children Agricultural Wage† 318 437.42 183.389 160 421.03 162.437 0.811
Notes: T-stat of differences in means computed clustering SE at the community level. All consumption values are expressed in per capita adult equivalent units. †Continuous 
outcomes conditional on being positive
1Data on home production is only available for two rounds of data, namely October 1998 and May 1999. 
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Table 12: Effect of OPORTUNIDADES on Private Transfers (Panels AI, AII), Other Public Transfers (Panels BI, BII) and Activitities of Daily Living (Panel CI) 
































Model AI.1 -PROBIT (Oct 98, Nov 99) -0.002 20847 0.070
(0.005)
Model AI.2 -PROBIT (Oct 98, Nov 99, Nov 00) -0.019 31071 0.067
(0.014)
Model AI.3 -PROBIT (Oct 98, Nov 99, Nov 00) -0.087* 0.148* 31071 0.067
(0.034) (0.059)
Model AI.4 -2SLS (Oct 98, Nov 99, Nov 00) -0.223** 0.531** 31083 0.067
(0.067) (0.193)
AII. Private Transfers Amount (monthly)†
Model AII.1 -LS (Oct 98, Nov 99) -54.798+
(29.780)
Model AII.2 -LS (Oct 98, Nov 99, Nov 00) -0.089 1512 337.618
(0.096)
Model AII.3 -LS (Oct 98, Nov 99, Nov 00) -0.587* 0.001* 1512 337.618
(0.234) (0.0004)




Model BI.1 -PROBIT (Oct 98 - Nov 99) -0.115** 30659 0.369
(0.022)
Model BI.2 -PROBIT (Oct 98 - Nov 00) -0.243** 50208 0.346
(0.047)
Model BI.3 -PROBIT (Oct 98 - Nov 00) -0.537** 0.611** 50208 0.346
(0.126) (0.190)
Model BI.4 -2SLS (Oct 98 - Nov 00) -0.611** 0.820** 50208 0.346
(0.084) (0.202)
BII. Public Transfers Amount (monthly)†
Model BII.1 -LS (Oct 98 - Nov 99) -9.534** 8732 90.544
(3.472)
Model BII.2 -LS (Oct 98 - Nov 00) -0.002 13881 91.991
(0.006)
Model BII.3 -LS (Oct 98 - Nov 00) -0.036* 6.55*10-5* 13881 91.991
(0.017) (2.99*10-5)
Model BII.4 -2SLS (Oct 98 - Nov 00) -0.073* 1.69*10-4* 13881 91.991
(0.032) (7.74*10-5)
CI. Activity of Dalily Living
3 (ADL)
Model CI.1 -LS (May 99 - Nov 99) 0.003+ 40491 0.978
(0.002)
Model CI.2 -LS (May 99, Nov 99, Nov 00) 0.073** 59907 0.979
(0.019)
Model CI.3 -LS (May 99, Nov 99, Nov 00) 0.065** 0.001 59907 0.979
(0.021) (0.001)
Model CI.4 -2SLS (May 99, Nov 99, Nov 00) 0.107** 59907 0.979
(0.038)
Model CI.4 -2SLS (May 99, Nov 99, Nov 00) 0.112* -0.0001 59907 0.979
(0.048) (0.003)
Notes: +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. For the probit models, marginal effects and robust standard errors clustered at the community level reported. LS and 2SLS 
regressions include community level random effects. All regressions include the following controls: wave dummies, head's and spouse's age, age squared and education level dummies, 
head's ethnicity (language), household size adult equivalent, dummies controlling for household demographics, baseline assets (home ownership, dirt floor and electricity), farm size at 
baseline and community characteristics (community organizations, distance to urban center and wages). Outliers trimmed at the top and bottom 0.5% of the OPORTUNDADES (public) and 
the private transfers distributions. For other public transfers, outliers trimmed at the top 5% of the distribution. †Conditional on being positive.
1Private transfers include both transfers from neighbours, relatives and friends living in the community and transfers received from migrants (conditional on a household member having 
migrated during the 5 years before the interview). Estimation limited to rounds: Oct 1998, Nov 1999 and Nov 2000 due to non-existent or non-comparable data.
2 Public transfers =1 if someone in the household receives help from Procrampo, Niños con Solidaridad and/or DIF food package. Public transfer amount includes the total household 
monetary value of the transfers received from Procampo and Niños con Solidaridad. Estimation limited to rounds Oct 1998 to Nov 00.
3Estimation limited to the sub-sample of prime age adults (18 to 49 years old) in May 1999, Nov 1999 and Nov 2000 due to non-existent data in other rounds. OPORTUNIDADES actual and
potential transfer amounts are expressed in per capita adult equivalent units for this set of regressions.
In Panels AI, BI and CI the OPORTUNIDADES potential and actual transfers (and its squared term) have been divided by 1000.  
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Table 13: Potential Biases in the  Consumption Equation: Private Transfers, Public Transfers and Increased Productivity.









Actual Transfer - monthly pc ae 1.055**
(0.049)
Total Actual Transfers (OPORTUNIDADES + Private) -monthly pc ae 1.035**
(0.048)
Total Actual Transfers (OPORTUNIDADES + Other Public + Private) -monthly pc ae 1.013**
(0.050)
Actual Cumulative Transfer -6 months lag pc ae 0.016** 0.015** 0.010**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of Observations 20282 20282 20267
Mean Consumption 181.476 181.476 181.985
B. Public Transfers
2  -controls 
Actual Transfer - monthly pc ae 0.913**
(0.035)
Total Actual Transfers (OPORTUNIDADES + Other Public) -monthly pc ae 0.961** 0.966**
(0.038) (0.038)
Actual Cumulative Transfer -6 months lag pc ae 0.020** 0.018** 0.018**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Receive Food Package DIF =1  7.454**
(2.302)
Number of Observations 30126 30126 30126
Mean Consumption 181.916 181.916 181.916
C. Increased Productivity: Activity Daily Living (ADL)
3 -controls 
Actual Transfer - monthly pc ae 0.685** 0.685** -
(0.046) (0.046) -
Actual Cumulative Transfer -6 months lag pc ae 0.015** 0.015** -
(0.003) (0.003) -
Activity of Daily Living (ADL) Household's Head -1.500 -
(7.706) -
Number of Observations 13179 13179 -
Mean Consumption 175.236 175.236 -
Notes: +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. SE in parentheses. All regressions include random effects at the community level and the following 
controls: wave dummies, head's and spouse's age, age squared and education level dummies, head's ethnicity (language), household size adult equivalent and household 
demographic variables, baseline assets (home ownership, dirt floor and electricity), farm size at baseline and community characteristics (community organizations, distance 
to urban center and wages). Consumption is expenditures expressed in per capita adult equivalent units and includes home production. Outliers trimmed at the top and 
bottom1% of the consumption and the total transfer distributions. pc means "per capita"; ae means "adult equivalent".  
1Because of the inclusion of home production and private transfers, estimation is limited to the following rounds: October 1998 and November 2000. Private transfers include 
both transfers from neighbours, relatives and friends living in the community and transfers received from migrants (conditional on a household member having migrated 
during the 5 years before the interview).
2Because of the inclusion of home production, estimation is limited to the rounds of October 1998, May 1999 and November 2000. Public transfers  include the total 
household monetary value of the  transfers received from Procampo and Niños con Solidaridad. DIF =1 if someone in the househod has received a subsidized food package
during the past month.
3Because of the inclusion of home production and ADLs, estimation is limited to the following rounds: May 1999 and November 2000.
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Table 14: Investment or Precautionary Savings? 





















(2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS)
Model A: TOT -controls
High Risk Area 0.020 0.086 0.117** 0.097 0.147** -1.545
(0.049) (0.300) (0.036) (0.221) (0.048) (0.970)
Total Household Actual Cumulative Transfer (/1000) 0.004* -0.004 0.004* 0.002 0.002 -0.008
(0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.027)
High Risk Area * Total HH Actual Cumulative Transfer (/1000) 0.000 -0.020 -0.006** 0.001 -0.008** 0.081
(0.003) (0.016) (0.002) (0.014) (0.003) (0.056)
Model B: TOT -controls
High Risk Area 0.009 -0.806+ 0.094 -0.288 0.037 -0.509
(0.101) (0.421) (0.078) (0.398) (0.098) (1.870)
Total Household Actual Cumulative Transfer (/1000) -0.001 -0.073 0.003 -0.057* 0.006 -0.197+
(0.006) (0.046) (0.005) (0.028) (0.006) (0.113)
Total Household Actual Cumulative Transfer Squared  (/1000) 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002* 0.012 0.006+
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.015) (0.003)
High Risk Area * Total HH Actual Cumulative Transfer (/1000) 0.002 0.132+ -0.002 0.068 -0.000 -0.099
(0.018) (0.071) (0.012) (0.072) (0.000) (0.324)
High Risk Area * Total HH Actual Cumulative Transfer Squared (/1000) -0.000 -0.005* -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.006
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.012)
Observations TOT Sub-Sample 9953 2968 9957 7366 10009 6342
Mean Dependent Variable TOT Sub-Sample  0.303 1.147 0.746 1.066 0.681 3.694
Proportion Households in High Risk Areas 0.093 0.104 0.093 0.097 0.093 0.094
Notes: +significant at 10%, *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%. Community level clustered SE in parantheses. All regressions include the following controls: wave 
dummies, head's and spouse's age, age squared and education level dummies, head's ethnicity (language), household size, dummies controlling for household 
demographics, baseline assets (home ownership, dirt floor and electricity) and community characteristics (community organizations, distance to urban center and wages). 
High risk areas are communities that have suffered more than 8 weather shocks between early 1997 and late 2000. The number of shocks per community in these years 
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APPENDIX 2 -GRAPHS 
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Graph 2: Share of Households by Number of Children Enrolled from 3rd Grade of Primary to 
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Sub-sample of Actual Treatment and Actual Controls






















































Sub-sample of Actual Treatment and Actual Controls
Graph 3b: Cumulative Actual and Potential Transfer Distributions
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